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the combined firm, whereas the acquirer’s cash holdings are negatively related to performance. This suggests that 
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the takeover, whereas acquisitions of a small target lead to a profitability decline.   
 
JEL codes: G34  
Key  words:  takeovers,  mergers  and  acquisitions,  long-term  operating  performance,  diversification,  hostile 
takeovers, means of payment, cross-border acquisitions, private target 
 
Acknowledgments: We acknowledge support from Rolf Visser for allowing us to use the databases of Deloitte 
Corporate  Finance. We are  grateful  for  valuable  comments  from  Hans Degryse,  Julian  Franks,  Marc  Goergen, 
Steven  Ongena,  and  Peter  Szilagyi,  as  well  as  from  the  participants  to  seminars  at  Tilburg  University.  Luc 
Renneboog is grateful to the Netherlands Organization for Scientific Research for a replacement subsidy of the 
programme ‘Shifts in Governance’; the authors also gratefully acknowledge support from the European Commission 
via the ‘New Modes of Governance’-project (NEWGOV) led by the European University Institute in Florence; 
contract nr. CIT1-CT-2004-506392. 
 
Contact details:  
Marina Martynova: The University of Sheffield Management School, 9 Mappin Street, S1 4DT Sheffield, UK; Tel: 
+44 (0) 114 222 3344; Fax: +44 (0) 114 222; Email: M.Martynova@sheffield.ac.uk  
Corresponding author: Luc Renneboog: Tilburg University, PO Box 90153, 5000 LE Tilburg, The Netherlands, Tel: 
+ 31 13 466 8210; Fax: + 31 13 466 2875; Email: Luc.Renneboog@uvt.nl   2
1.   Introduction 
 
During the last decade, mergers and acquisitions (M&As) involving European companies have 
occurred in unprecedented numbers. In 1999, the total value of the intra-European M&A activity 
has peaked at a record level of USD 1.4 trillion (Thomson Financial Securities Data) and for the 
first  time  became  as  large  as  that  of  the  US  market  for  corporate  control.  Despite  these 
developments, empirical research on M&A activity remains mostly confined to the UK and US 
and there is little known about the effect of Continental European takeovers on the operating 
performance of bidding and target firms.  
 
In this paper, we investigate whether and to what extend European companies improve their 
profitability  subsequent  to  the  completion  of  takeover  transactions.  The  research  question  is 
appealing  for  the  following  three  reasons.  First,  empirical  evidence  on  the  post-acquisition 
performance of European firms is virtually non-existent. To our best knowledge, the literature in 
this  field  comprises  only  two  studies:  Mueller  (1980)  and  Gugler  et  al.  (2003).  Our  study 
contributes  to  this  literature  by  updating  their  evidence  for  the  sample  of  the  most  recent 
European M&As and by checking the robustness of the results using an up-to-date methodology 
of measuring the improvement or decreases in post-merger operating performance. Second, even 
for the US, research on the improvement of post-merger operating performance is rather limited 
and its conclusions are contradictory. Whereas some studies document a significant improvement 
in  operating  performance  following  acquisitions  (Healy  et  al.,  1992;  Heron  and  Lie,  2002; 
Rahman and Limmack, 2004), others reveal a significant decline in post-acquisition operating 
performance (Kruse et al., 2002; Yeh and Hoshino, 2001; Clark and Ofek, 1994). Furthermore, 
there are a number of studies that demonstrate insignificant changes in the post-merger operating 
performance (Ghosh, 2001; Moeller and Schlingemann, 2004; Sharma and Ho, 2002). A third 
reason for this study is that we intend to investigate the determinants of the changes in post-
merger profitability of bidding and target firms. In particular, we test whether characteristics of 
the M&A transaction such as the means of payment, deal hostility, and industry relatedness have 
an impact on the long-term performance of the merged firm.    
 
Our analysis is based on a sample of 155 European mergers and acquisitions, completed between 
1997 and 2001. We employ four different measures of operating performance: EBITDA and 
EBITDA corrected for changes in working capital, each scaled by the book value of assets and 
by  sales.  Our  results  can  be  summarized  as  follows.  First,  we  find  that  the  post-merger   3
profitability of the combined firm is not significantly different from the aggregate performance of 
the bidding and target firms prior to the merger. This demonstrates that corporate takeovers are 
not able to engender substantial augmentations in operating performance as is often claimed by 
the merged company, but also that mergers and acquisitions do not generate poor performance as 
was  often  claimed  in  earlier  academic  research.  Still,  we  find  that  the  post-acquisition 
performance  of  the  combined  firm  significantly  varies  across  M&As  with  different 
characteristics: hostile versus friendly bids, tender offers versus negotiated deals, and domestic 
versus cross-border transactions. Furthermore, cash reserves of the acquiring firm prior to the bid 
and  the  relative  size  of  the  target  firm  are  important  determinants  of  the  post-acquisition 
profitability.  Consistent  with  previous  US  studies,  we  find  no  differences  in  operating 
performance of industry-related and diversifying takeovers and deals that involve different means 
of payment.  
 
The outline of this paper is as follows. Section 2 provides an overview of the prior studies on 
post-acquisition  performance.  Section  3  describes  our  sample  selection  procedure  and 
methodology used to measure changes in operating performance. The characteristics of our final 
sample are also given in section 3. Section 4 presents the main results of our analysis regarding 
changes  in  the  operating  performance  of  bidding  and  target  firms  subsequent  to  takeovers. 
Section  5  investigates  the  determinants  of  the  post-acquisition  performance.  Section  6 
summarizes the results and concludes.  
 
2.   Prior research 
 
2.1  Post-acquisition performance 
Previous  empirical  studies  yield  inconsistent  results  about  changes  in  operating  performance 
following corporate acquisitions. The existent empirical studies can be evenly divided into three 
groups: studies that report a significant improvement in the post-acquisition performance, those 
that  document  a  significant  deterioration,  and  those  that  find  insignificant  changes  in 
performance. Table 1 provides an overview of these studies. The most recent US studies that 
employ more sophisticated techniques to measure changes in the post-merger performance tend 
to show that the profitability of the bidding and target firms remain unchanged (Moeller and 
Schlingemann, 2004; Ghosh, 2001) or significantly improves after the takeover (Heron and Lie, 
2002;  Linn  and  Switzer,  2001).  The  conclusion  of  UK  studies  are  more  contradictory,  as 
Dickerson et al. (1997) find a significant decline in the post-acquisition performance, whereas   4
Powell and Stark (2005) show a significant growth. Similarly to the UK studies, Asian studies 
also yield contradictory results. Evidence suggest that Japanese M&As incur a decrease in post-
acquisition operating performance of the merged firm (Kruse et al., 2002; Yeh and Hoshino, 
2001), Malaysian takeovers are associated with better post-acquisition performance (Rahman and 
Limmack, 2004), while Australian M&As lead to insignificant changes in the profitability of 
bidding and target firms after the takeover (Sharma and Ho, 2002). For Continental Europe, 
Gugler,  Mueller,  Yurtoglu  and  Zulehner  (2003)  document  a  significant  decline  in  post-
acquisition sales of the combined firm, but an insignificant increase in post-acquisition profit.  
 [INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE] 
 
2.2  The determinants of the post-acquisition performance 
 
Method of payment: cash versus stock 
Empirical evidence suggests that the means of payment is an important determinant of the long-
term post-acquisition performance: cash offers are associated with stronger improvements than 
takeovers involving other forms of payment (Linn and Switzer, 2001; Ghosh, 2001; Moeller and 
Schlingemann, 2004). A possible explanation is that cash deals are more likely to lead to the 
replacement  of  (underperforming)  target  management,  which  could  result  into  performance 
improvement (Denis and Denis, 1995; Ghosh and Ruland, 1998; Parrino and Harris, 1999). An 
alternative explanation is that a cash payment is frequently financed with debt (Ghosh and Jain, 
2000; Martynova and Renneboog, 2006). Debt financing restricts the availability of corporate 
funds at the managers’ disposal and hence minimizes the scope for free cash flow problems 
(Jensen and Meckling, 1976). As such, takeovers paid with cash are more likely to bring about 
more  managerial  discipline.  However,  the  empirical  literature  does  not  finds  a  significant 
relationship between the method of payment and post-merger operating performance (Healy et 
al., 1992; Powell and Stark, 2005; Heron and Lie, 2002; Sharma and Ho, 2002).  
 
Deal atmosphere: friendly versus hostile 
Hostility in corporate takeovers may be associated with better long-term operating performance 
of the merged company. The reason is that hostile bids are more expensive for the bidding firms, 
such that only takeovers that have high synergy potential are likely to succeed (Burkart and 
Panunzi, 2006). However, the empirical literature finds no evidence in support of this conjecture 
(Healy et al., 1992; Ghosh, 2001; and Powell and Stark, 2005). The acquisition method (a tender 
offer or a negotiated deal) may also be an important determinant of the post-merger performance.    5
Likewise, the empirical evidence does not unveil any such relation (Switzer, 1996; Linn and 
Switzer, 2001; Heron and Lie, 2002; Moeller and Schlingemann, 2003).  
 
The acquirer’s leverage and cash reserves 
The activities of highly leveraged acquirers may be subject to severe monitoring by banks such 
that  unprofitable  M&As  would  be  effectively  prevented  ex-ante.  Empirical  evidence  on  this 
relationship is mixed: whereas Ghosh and Jain (2000), Kang, Shivdasani and Yamada (2000), 
and  Harford (1999) provide evidence in  line with  the  conjecture
1, Linn and Switzer (2001), 
Switzer  (1996),  and  Clark  and  Ofek  (1994)  find  no  significant  relation  between  acquirer’s 
leverage and post-merger operating performance.    
As follows from Jensen’s (1986) free cash flow theory, acquirers with excessive cash holdings 
are  more  likely  to  make  poor  acquisitions  and  hence  experience  significant  post-merger 
underperformance relative to their peers who had more limited cash holdings. Empirical evidence 
by Harford (1999) and Moeller and Schlingemann (2004) confirms this conjecture.  
 
Industry relatedness: focused versus diversifying acquisitions 
Although diversifying (or conglomerate) acquisitions are expected to create operational and/or 
financial synergies, the creation of diversified firms is associated with a number of disadvantages 
such as rent-seeking behavior by divisional managers (Scharfstein and Stein, 2000), bargaining 
problems within the firm (Rajan et al., 2000), or bureaucratic rigidity (Shin and Stulz, 1998). 
These disadvantages of diversification may outweigh the alleged synergies and result in poor 
post-merger performance of the combined firm. Furthermore, diversifying M&As may be an 
outgrowth of the agency problems between managers and shareholders (Shleifer and Vishny, 
1989),  which  is  also  likely  to  result  in  the  deterioration  of  corporate  performance  after  the 
takeover. While earlier studies confirm these conjectures (Healy et al., 1992; Heron and Lie, 
2002), later studies find the relationship between diversifying takeovers and poor post-merger 
performance  insignificant  (Powell  and  Stark,  2005;  Linn  and  Switzer,  2001;  Switzer,  1996; 
Sharma  and  Ho,  2002).  Furthermore,  Kruse  et  al.  (2002)  and  Ghosh  (2001)  document  that 
diversifying acquisitions significantly outperform their industry-related peers.   
 
                                                 
1  Ghosh  and  Jain  (2000)  find  that  an  increase  in  financial  leverage  around  M&As  is  significantly  positively 
correlated with the announcement abnormal stock returns. Kang et al (2000) show for 154 Japanese mergers between 
1977 and 1993 that the amount of bank debt is positively and significantly related to the acquirer abnormal returns. 
Harford  (1999)  shows  that  cash-rich  firms  experience  negative  stock  price  reactions  following  acquisition 
announcements, which is more negative when there are higher amounts of excess cash.   6
Relative size of the target 
Takeovers of relatively large targets are more likely to achieve sizeable operating and financial 
synergies and economies of scale than small acquisitions, therefore leading to stronger post-
acquisition operating performance. However, the acquirer of a relatively large target may face 
difficulties in integrating the target firm, which could lead to a deterioration of performance. 
There is empirical evidence in support of both conjectures. Linn and Switzer (2001) and Switzer 
(1996) provide evidence that acquisitions of relatively large targets outperform those of small 
targets. Clark and Ofek (1994) document that difficulties with managing a large combined firm 
outweigh the operating and financial synergies in large acquisitions and result in the deterioration 
of operating performance. However, most of empirical evidence reports no significant relation 
between the relative target size and post-merger performance (Powell and Stark, 2005; Moeller 
and Schlingemann, 2003; Heron and Lie, 2002; Sharma and Ho, 2002; Kruse et al., 2002; Healy 
et al., 1992). 
 
Domestic versus cross-border deals  
In cross-border acquisitions, bidding and target firms are likely to benefit by taking advantage of 
imperfections  in  international  capital,  factor,  and  product  markets  (Hymer,  1976),  by 
internalizing the R&D capabilities of target companies (Eun et al., 1996), and by expanding their 
businesses  into  new  markets  (as  a  response  to  globalization  trends).  As  such,  cross-border 
acquisitions are expected to outperform their domestic peers. However, regulatory and cultural 
differences between the bidder and target countries may lead to complications in managing the 
post-merger process and hence the failure to achieve the anticipated merger synergies. As a result 
of such difficulties in cross-border bids, the post-merger performance of the combined firm may 
deteriorate  (Schoenberg,  1999).  Moeller  and  Schlingemann  (2003),  Goergen  and  Renneboog 
(2004),  Martynova  and  Renneboog  (2006b)  show  that  that  firms  acquiring  foreign  targets 
experience significantly lower takeover announcement returns than their counterparts acquiring 
domestic targets. Gugler et al. (2003) report a significant effect of cross-border deals on post-
acquisition operating performance. 
 
3.   Data and methodology 
 
3.1  Sample selection 
Our sample of European acquisitions that were completed between 1997 and 2001 is selected 
from  the  Mergers  and  Acquisitions  Database  of  the  Securities  Data  Company  (SDC)  and   7
Zephyr.
2 Only intra-European domestic and cross-border takeovers are included, in which both 
the acquirer and the target are from Continental Europe or the UK. We retain the takeover deals 
in which at least one of the participants is a publicly traded company. We exclude from the 
sample  deals  in  which  the  acquirer  is  the  management  or  the  employees,  or  the  target  is  a 
subsidiary of another company. Furthermore, we exclude M&As in which either a bidder or a 
target (or both) are financial institutions (banks, savings banks, unit trusts, mutual funds and 
pension funds). We also removed 15 takeovers in which the target was re-sold or the acquirer 
was acquired by a third party within three years after the deal completion.  This selection results 
in 858 European M&A deals (see Table 2).  
 
We further require profit and loss accounts and balance sheet data to be available for acquirers 
and targets for at least 1 year prior and 1 year after the acquisition. Accounting data is collected 
from Amadeus Extended database.
3  In our analysis, we focus on the year of the transaction’s 
completion, rather than the year of the announcement of the bid. Our sample includes a number 
of takeovers for which the year of announcement and year of completion do not coincide. For 
89% of deals, a completion date is available. When a completion date is not available, we take 
the announcement year. Table 2 summarizes the overall sample selection procedure which results 
in the final sample of 155 deals.  
 [INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE] 
 
3.2    Sample description 
 
Our final sample of intra-European M&As comprises 155 deals (see Table 3) and includes 144 
(93%) friendly and 11 (7%) hostile takeovers, where an acquisition is considered hostile if the 
board of directors of the target firm rejects the offer, or when there are multiple competing 
acquirers. All-cash acquisitions account for 70% of the sample, whereas the reminder are mixed 
(20%) and equity-paid (10%) deals. About one-third of the sample are acquisitions that involve 
                                                 
2 The reason for selecting deals that were launched and completed between 1997 and 2001 is that accounting data for 
European firms are available in the Amadeus database only from 1995 onwards. For this study, we require that at 
least 2 years of pre-acquisition accounting data to be available. Therefore, we were forced to restrict our sample only 
to M&As completed as of 1997. The upper-time bound of our sample is coming from another restriction of Amadeus 
database: the latest accounting data available in Amadeus refers to 2004. Thus, we were also forced to restrict our 
sample to M&As completed by 2001, as this allows us to analyse the post-merger operating performance over 3 
years after the bid completion.  
3 Amadeus Extended is an online database that contains information on 8,600,000 public and private companies in 
38  European countries.  Initially,  we  employed  Amadeus  Standard  database which  contains  250,000  public  and 
private companies in Europe. However, we find that Amadeus Standard covers only 40% of bidding and target firms 
from our sample. Using Amadeus Extended, we find data for 73% of our acquirers and targets (624 M&As).    8
bidding and target firms operating in the same industry, defined based on the 2-digit NACE 
industry code classification.
 4  
 
Most of the acquisitions involve relatively small target companies. The median relative size of 
the target firm, defined as the ratio of target’s to acquirer’s sales in the year prior to the takeover, 
does not exceed 9%.
5 However, acquisitions of relatively large targets are not rare either: in one-
third of our M&As the relative size of the target firm exceeds 20%. The largest transaction in our 
sample is the mega-acquisition of Mannesmann by Vodafone in 2000, with a deal value of USD 
203 billion. Other large transactions are the acquisition of Elf Aquitaine by TotalFina in 1999 
(USD 50 billion), the merger between Germany’s Hoechst and France’s Rhone-Poulenc in 1999 
(USD 22 billion), and the acquisition of Airtel by Vodafone in 2000 (USD 14 billion). The 
smallest transaction was the acquisition of C.K. Coffee by Coburg Group in 2001 (both British 
companies), with deal value of only USD 140,000.  
[INSERT TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE] 
 
 3.3  Selection of peer companies 
 
To measure changes in operating performance following a takeover, we compare the realized 
performance with the benchmark performance which would be generated in case the takeover bid 
would not have taken place. However, while performing this comparison one should take into 
account that operating performance is not only affected by the takeover but also by a host of 
other factors. To isolate the takeover effect, the literature suggests an adjustment for the industry 
trend (see e.g. Healy et al., 1992). Alternatively, one could match the sample of firms involved in 
M&As by industry, asset size, and a performance measure (typically the market-to-book ratio or 
EBIT)  with  non-merging  companies  (as  suggested  in  Barber  and  Lyon,  1996), and  examine 
whether merging companies outperform their non-merging peers prior and subsequent to the bid. 
In our analysis we employ both adjustment methodologies in order to check whether the choice 
of the adjustment model affects our conclusions. 
  
As a proxy for industry trends, we consider for each bidding and target firm from our sample the 
performance of a median company that operates in the same industry. The industry median is 
                                                 
4 Changing to a 4-digit NACE classification does not materially change the results in the remainder of our study. In 
51  deals (33%),  acquirer  and/or  target  had NACE industry  code  7415  (‘holding  company’),  in  which case we 
assumed industry relatedness to be ‘unknown’. 
5 When the relative size of the target firm is calculated as the ratio of target’s and acquirer’s book values and of total 
assets, the median relative size is 8.81%.    9
identified from the pool of all companies recorded in Amadeus database that have same 4-digit 
industry code as our sample firm in the year prior to the acquisition. The firm with the median 
EBITDA-to-assets ratio is then selected as our industry median peer.   
 
The  Amadeus  database  has  also  been  used  to  identify  the  industry,  size,  and  performance-
matched peer company for each bidder (and each target) from our sample. For each bidding 
(target) firm, the list of Amadeus companies with the same industry code and available EBITDA-
to-Assets ratio has been further filtered down to the list of firms that fall within the same size 
quartile (as measured by total assets) as the bidding (target) firm. From this list, we select the 
company with an  EBITDA-to-Assets  ratio that is  closest  to the ratio of  the analyzed  bidder 
(target). The selected firm makes our industry, size, and performance-matched peer.
6 Caution is 
taken to select peer companies that were not engaged in M&A activity over the period studied.       
 
3.4  Measures of operating performance 
 
Most studies on post-acquisition operating performance define operating performance as ‘pre-tax 
operating cash flow’, which is the sum of operating income, depreciation, interest expenses, and 
taxes (see e.g. Healy et al., 1992; Ghosh, 2001; Heron and Lie, 2002; etc.). It is typically argued 
that such a performance measure is unaffected by either the accounting method employed to 
compute  depreciation  or  non-operating  activities  (interest  and  tax  expenses).  However,  this 
measure is not a ‘pure’ cash flow performance measure, as it does not take into account changes 
in working capital (changes in receivables, payables and inventories). In this study, we employ 
two  measures  of  cash  flow:  (1)  EBITDA-only  and  (2)  EBITDA  minus  changes  in  working 
capital.
7  To  adjust  for  the  differences  in  size  across  companies,  we  divide  these  cash  flow 
measures  by  (1)  book  value  of  assets  and  (2)  sales.
8  Overall,  we  consider  four  following 
measures of operating performance:  
                                                 
6 Using the ‘Peer Group’-function in Amadeus, it was usually possible to gather an international (European) list of 
peer companies within the same industry. However, this function returned an error message when the number of peer 
companies  in  a  specific  industry  exceeded  500  (this  happened  often  when  a  company  had  NACE  code  7415 
(“holding company”), returning a huge number of industry peers). In that case we downloaded a national list of 
companies within the same industry, instead of an international list.  
7 The number of our observations for cash flow measure (2) is lower than for measure (1), because changes in 
working capital are not available for several bidders, targets, and/or their peers from our sample. 
8 Some U.S. research uses a third variable to scale cash flows: the market value of assets. Market value is insensitive 
to whether “purchase” or “pooling of interest” accounting is used in acquisitions. Until recently, U.S. companies 
under U.S. GAAP were free to choose between the “purchase method” and the “pooling of interest method” to 
account for their acquisitions. In the former method, the acquirer records the target’s assets at their fair value. If the 
amount paid for a company is greater than fair market value, the difference is reflected as goodwill. The pooling of 
interests does not require the target’s assets to be recorded at fair value and no goodwill is booked. The problem with   10
(a) (EBITDA - ¨:&%9assets ,  
(b). (EBITDA - ¨:&6DOHV 
(c) EBITDA / BVassets and  
(d) EBITDA / Sales. 
The first measure of operating performance shows how effectively a company is using its assets 
to generate cash. The second measure shows how much cash is generated for every dollar of 
sales.  The  third  and  fourth  measures  do  not  include  changes  in  working  capital,  but  are 
comparable to the pre-tax cash flow as is used in most of the past empirical research. Figure 1 
summarizes  our  methodology  to  estimate  changes  in  operating  performance  following  the 
takeover.  
[INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE] 
 
Since our analysis focuses on the changes in profitability of the combined firm for the period 
preceding the takeover, we sum the cash flows of acquirer and target and scale it by the sum of 
their  total assets  or  sales.  That  is,  we  compute  the  ‘raw’  pre-acquisition  profitability  of  the 
combined firm as follows: 
t T t A
t T t A
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The  peer  pre-acquisition  profitability  of  the  combined  firm  is  then  computed  as  a  weighted 
average of the profitability of the acquirer’s and the target’s peer companies; where the relative 















































For the years following the acquisition, the ‘raw’ profitability of the combined firm is the realized 





CF = ,  
                                                                                                                                                             
the use of the market value of assets to scale cash flows is that the market value can hide operating improvements: 
the market  value may  already  incorporate possible improvements (or declines) in  operating  performance in the 
denominator on the day of the takeover announcement. Hence, possible changes in the numerator (cash flows) can 
be neutralized by the change in the market value of the denominator. Healy et al (1992) solve this problem by 
excluding  the  changes  in  market  capitalizations  at  the  merger  announcement.  However,  even  after  excluding 
changes in equity value around the announcement, performance may still be biased because acquiring firms’ market 
values decline systematically over three to five years following acquisitions (Agrawal et al., 1992). Another reason 
why we did not scale by market value is that the European accounting regulation (IAS) only allows the purchase 
method of accounting in corporate acquisitions. Finally, in order to be able to use market values we require both 
acquirer and target to be listed - a requirement that reduces our sample by half.   11
The peer post-acquisition profitability of the combined firm is calculated in a similar way as for 
the pre-acquisition years: a weighted average of the profitability of the acquirer’s and target’s 
peers.  However,  the  weights  used  to  compute  the  peer  post-acquisition  profitability  of  the 
combined firm are the ones that we also used to compute the peer pre-acquisition profitability. 
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A company’s profitability adjusted for industry trend is calculated as a difference between the 
company’s ‘raw’ and peer profitability:  
t peer t firm t adjusted ind industry CF CF CF , , , - = -   and   t peer t firm t adjusted perf size ind adjusted perf size ind CF CF CF , , , , , , , - - = -  
In order to assess the changes in the profitability of the combined firm caused by the takeover, 
we employ two following models: the change model and the intercept model. The change model 
calculates the change in profitability for each firm whereby the median profitability of the 3 years 
prior to the takeover is compared to the median profitability over the three years subsequent to 
the merger. With a Wilcoxon signed rank test, we then test whether the median post-acquisition 
performance is significantly different from the median pre-acquisition performance.
9 An analysis 
of changes in operating performance was also performed using averages (over the three years 
before and after the acquisition) instead of medians. The results are qualitatively similar and are 
available upon request.  
The intercept model estimates changes in operating performance withWKHLQWHUFHSW 0) from the 
following regression: 




adjusted medianCF medianCF 1 0  
FDFWRU 1  reflects  a  relation  between  pre-  and  post-acquisition  profits,  whereas  changes  in 
profitability are captured by  WKH LQWHUFHSW  0). To test for the significance of the changes we 
apply a standard t-test.     
 
4.   Changes in corporate performance caused by M&As: results 
 
4.1    Does operating performance improve following acquisitions? 
                                                 
9 The use of medians has the disadvantage that median differences are sometimes counterintuitive. For example, the 
post-acquisition performance minus the pre-acquisition performance can be a negative, whereas one would expect a 
positive difference (e.g. when the median pre-performance is –0.04% and the median post-performance is 0.84%). 
This is caused by the fact that median differences are not calculated simply by subtracting median pre-performance 
from median post-performance, but are calculated as the median of the differences.    12
Table  4  exhibits  insignificant  changes  in  profitability  of  the  combined  firm  following  the 
takeover. None of our four performance measures reveal significant changes: measures scaled by 
book value indicate an insignificant decrease in the performance (-0.01% for measure 3 and –
0.62% for measure 1) while measures scaled by sales point out an insignificant increase (+0.15% 
for measure 2 and +0.16% for measure 4). The result is in line with the previous empirical 
studies  that  document  insignificant  changes  in  operation  performance  following  mergers 
(Mueller,  1980;  Sharma  and  Ho,  2002;  and  Ghosh,  2001).  On  the  other  hand,  the  result 
contradicts  the findings  of  a  number  of  other studies  showing  a  significant  improvement  or 
deterioration  in  post-acquisition  performance  (Kruse  et  al.,  2002;  Yeh  and  Hoshino,  2001; 
Dickerson et al., 1997; Clark and Ofek, 1994; Rahman and Limmack, 2004). However, this 
difference in the results may be driven by the fact that none of the previous studies use a pure 
cash flow measure (which includes changes in working capital). This omission may induce a 
downward bias in their profitability measures. Furthermore, most of the US studies that find 
significant increases in cash flow performance, employ market value of assets to scale cash flows 
(Linn and Switzer, 2001; Parrino and Harris, 1999; Switzer, 1996; Healy et al., 1992), whereas 
our analysis is based on the book value of assets and sales.  
[INSERT TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE] 
 
The comparison of the ‘raw’ performance (without adjusting for the industry) reveals that the 
post-acquisition  cash  flow  declines  substantially,  with  3  out  of  the  4  performance  measures 
showing significant decreases ranging within –0.65% and –1.73% (see Table 4). The result is in 
line  with  Powell  and  Stark  (2005),  who  show  that  the  ‘raw’  operating  performance  of  the 
combined firm generally deteriorates following UK takeovers.  
 
Another important result presented in Table 4 is that bidding and target companies significantly 
outperform  the  median  companies  in  their  respective  industries  prior  to  the  takeover.  This 
suggests that companies undertake corporate acquisitions in periods when they are performing 
better their median peers in the industry.  
 
We  further  investigate  whether  the  inclusion  of  changes  in  the  working  capital  into  our 
performance measure has a significant impact on the overall results. Table 5 reports the changes 
in the use of working capital over the post-acquisition period compared to those over the pre-
acquisition  period.  Our  evidence  suggests  that  the  use  of  working  capital  does  not  change 
significantly following the takeover.     13
[INSERT TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE] 
 
4.2    Robustness checks  
In  this  section,  we  investigate  whether  our  results  are  robust  with  respect  to  different 
specifications  of  the  profitability  measures.  First,  we  recalculate  changes  in  the  operating 
performance using means rather than medians (see section 3.4). That is, for each combined firm, 
we calculate mean annual pre- and post-acquisition performance and adjust it to the mean pre- 
and post-operating performance of the combined peer companies. Expectedly, we find that the 
results based on means are more volatile than those based on medians because of the influence of 
outliers.  Nonetheless,  our  initial  conclusion  remains  unchanged,  as  we  find  no  statistically 
significant changes in the operating performance following acquisition.   
 
Second, we employ the market value of assets as an alternative scale factor for our cash flow 
measure, as applied in previous U.S. studies. Following Healy et al (1992), we define the market 
value of assets as the market capitalization of equity plus the book value of net debt. In some 
cases, new peers have to be selected, as some original peers are not listed and hence lack market 
capitalization  data.  The  results  indicate  that,  when  the  market  value  is  used  to  scale  the 
performance measures, changes in the operating performance following takeovers are positive.
10 
However, as none of the changes is significant, our initial conclusion remains unchanged. 
 
Third, we examine whether the intercept model yields conclusions different from the change 
model. Panel A of Table 6 exhibits that, consistent with Powell and Stark (2005), Ghosh, (2001), 
Linn  and  Switzer  (2001),  and  Switzer  (1996),  the  intercept  model  gives  structurally  higher 
estimates of the performance improvements than the change model. The explanation is that the 
change  model  is  based  on  medians  and  is  therefore  less  sensitive  to  outliers,  whereas  the 
intercept model is based on means. Panel B shows that the slope coefficients are significant in 7 
out  of  8  regressions,  which  suggests  that  the  post-acquisition  performance is  related  to  pre-
acquisition performance. Strikingly, when we adjust operating performance only by industry, we 
find that high pre-acquisition profitability is associated with higher post-acquisition profitability. 
However,  when  the  adjustment  is  made  on  the  basis  of  industry,  size  and  performance,  we 
observe a significant negative relation: high pre-acquisition profitability is followed by lower 
post-acquisition results. This highlights the importance of the adjustment approach employed and 
may explain the contradictory results across many studies. 
                                                 
10 Summary tables of the robustness checks are available upon request.    14
[INSERT TABLE 6 ABOUT HERE] 
   
5.  The determinants of the post-acquisition operating performance  
 
In this section, we investigate whether the characteristics of the takeover deal predict the post-
acquisition performance of the combined firm. We test whether post-acquisition performance of 
the merged firm varies across takeovers with different means of payment, degree of hostility, 
business expansion strategy (focus versus diversification), and geographical scope of the deal 
(domestic versus cross-border M&As). We also investigate whether the relative size of the target 
firm  and  the  pre-acquisition  leverage  and  cash  holdings  of  the  acquirer  influence  the  post-
acquisition performance of the combined firm.  Our primarily focus in this section is on the ‘raw’ 
performance and the performance adjusted for industry, size and pre-event performance.
11 Also, 
we  present  results  only  for  the  profitability  measures  that  are  corrected  for  the  changes  in 
working capital: (EBITDA - ¨:&%9assets and (EBITDA - ¨:&6DOHV 
 
5.1  Method of payment: cash versus equity 
Table  7 shows the post-acquisition performance of  the merged firms for the  sub-samples of 
takeovers partitioned by means of payment: all-cash offers, cash-and-equity offers, and all-equity 
offers. The results presented in the table suggest that there are no significant differences in the 
profitability of corporate takeovers that employ different methods of payment. The results are in 
line with previous studies (Healy et al., 1992; Powell and Stark, 2005; Heron and Lie, 2002; 
Sharma and Ho, 2002).  
 [INSERT TABLE 7 ABOUT HERE] 
 
5.2  Deal atmosphere: friendly versus hostile takeovers 
Panel A of Table 8 shows that hostility in corporate takeovers is associated with lower post-
merger profitability. However, the effect is not statistically significant. Therefore, we conclude 
that there is no evidence that hostile takeovers are able to create more (long-term) synergistic 
value than friendly ones. The result is consistent with previous empirical findings for the US (see 
e.g. Gregory, 1997; Ghosh, 2001; Louis 2004). 
 [INSERT TABLE 8 ABOUT HERE] 
 
                                                 
11 The tesults of the analysis based on the performance adjusted for industry is available upon request.   15
The lack of significant differences in the performance of hostile and friendly offers may be due 
to the fact that the sample of friendly acquisitions includes a high number of deals conducted in a 
form  of  a tender  offer, which  are almost  as expensive  as  hostile  takeovers
12.  Therefore,  we 
further test  whether  the  form  of  the  acquisition  (tender  offer  versus  negotiated  deal)  has  an 
impact on the post-merger profitability of the combined firm. Panel B of Table 8 reports that the 
difference  in  profitability  of  tender  offers  and  negotiated  deals  is  statistically  insignificant. 
However, the difference seems to be significant in economic terms, as we find that the combined 
profitability of the bidding and target firms somewhat declines following a tender offer, whereas 
it increases following a negotiated M&A deal. The overall results are similar to Switzer (1996), 
Linn  and  Switzer  (2001)  and  Moeller  and  Schlingemann  (2003),  who  find  no  statistical 
difference in the long-term performance of hostile and friendly acquisitions in the US.    
  
5.3  Pre-acquisition leverage and cash holdings of the acquirer 
 
In  this  section,  we  investigate  whether  highly  leveraged  acquirers  outperform  low  leveraged 
acquirers due to better creditor monitoring. We divide our sample into quartiles by the acquirers’ 
pre-acquisition  leverage  and  test  for  significance  of  the  differences  in  post-acquisition 
profitability of the combined firms across the sub-samples. We define leverage as the ratio of the 
book value of total debt (long-term and short-term debt) to the book value of total assets.
 13 Panel 
A of Table 9 shows that higher levels of pre-acquisition leverage do not lead to higher post-
acquisition profitability. Therefore, we conclude that pre-acquisition acquirer’s leverage has no 
impact on the operating performance of the combined firm following the takeover. Likewise, 
none of the US studies find a significant relation between leverage and post-acquisition operating 
performance (e.g. Linn and Switzer, 2001; Switzer, 1996; Clark and Ofek, 1994).  
[INSERT TABLE 9 ABOUT HERE] 
 
Acquirer’s  cash  reserves  may  be  another  important  determinant  of  the  post-acquisition 
performance  of  the  combined  firm,  as  Jensen’s  (1986)  free  cash  flow  theory  predicts  that 
managers  of  cash-rich  firms  are  more  likely  to  be  involved  in  poor  takeovers.  We  test  this 
                                                 
12 Grossman and Hart (1980) show that small shareholders may hold out their shares in a tender offer until the bidder 
increases the offer price, hence making tender offers one the most expensive forms of acquisitions. 
13 The first quartile sub-sample includes companies with leverage lower than 5.55%; the leverage of companies in 
the second quartile sub-sample ranges between 5.55% and 16.79%; in the third quartile it is between 16.79% and 
32.44%; and in the fourth quartile it is above 32.44%. For 7 acquirers, the pre-acquisition leverage is not available 
and hence these companies are excluded from the analysis.   16
conjecture by  comparing the post-acquisition profitability of combined companies across  the 
quartiles  based  on  the  relative  amount  of  cash  reserves  held  by  the  acquirer  prior  to  the 
acquisition. We define an acquirer’s cash reserves as the firm’s cash and cash equivalents scaled 
by book value of total assets one year prior to the acquisition.
14 Panel B of Table 9 shows that, 
even though none of the changes in post-acquisition profitability are statistically significant, there 
is a clear trend towards better long-term performance of the takeovers by acquirers with lower 
cash reserves. Acquirers with the lowest level of cash holdings (first quartile) experience an 
increase in the post-acquisition profitability by 1.57%, whereas acquirers with the highest level 
of cash reserves (fourth quartile) experience a decline by 2.46%. The results are in line with the 
findings  of  Harford  (1999),  who  shows  that  acquisitions  by  cash-rich  companies  lead  to 
significant deteriorations in the operating performance of the combined firm. 
 
5.4  Industry relatedness: focus versus diversification strategy 
A number empirical studies is dedicated to the analysis of whether the relatedness of the merging 
firms’ businesses is associated with higher post-merger profitability (see e.g. Powell and Stark, 
2005; Linn and Switzer, 2001; Switzer, 1996; Sharma and Ho, 2002). There seems to be no 
significant difference in the post-merger profitability of related and unrelated acquisitions, of 
takeovers with a focus strategy and diversifying mergers, of horizontal and vertical takeovers, of 
takeovers that aim at product expansion and those that do not. Similarly to these studies, Table 
10 unveils no significant relation between takeover strategy (diversification vs. focus) and the 
post-acquisition  performance  of  the  combined  firms.
15  We  consider  an  acquisition  to  be 
diversifying if the acquiring and target companies operate in unrelated industries as defined by 
their  2-digit  NACE  industry  classification.
16  We  conclude  that  a  takeover  strategy  based  on 
industry-relatedness has no impact on the post-acquisition performance of the combined firm. 
[INSERT TABLE 10 ABOUT HERE] 
 
5.5  Relative size of the target 
                                                 
14 The first quartile sub-sample includes companies with cash reserves lower than 2.47% of total assets, the cash 
reserves of companies in the second quartile sub-sample range between 2.47% and 6.39% of total assets, in the third 
quartile cash is between 6.39% and 15.37%, and in the fourth quartile it is above 15.37%. For 2 acquirers, the pre-
acquisition data on cash reserves are not available and these companies are excluded from the analysis.  
15 We exclude 51 M&As from the analysis when either the acquirer or the target (or both) have 7415 (‘holding 
company’) as NACE industry code or when the NACE code for one of the parties involved in the deal is not 
available. 
16 As a robustness check, we also perform the analysis based on the 4-digit NACE industry code classification. We 
find that employing a 4-digit industry code does not materially affect the results.   17
The long-term M&A performance literature yields contradictory conclusions about whether or 
not  the  size  of  the  takeover  transaction  matters  for  the  post-acquisition  profitability  of  the 
combined firm. To test whether the size matters in European M&As, we partition our sample into 
two sub-samples by the relative size of the target firm. The sub-sample of ‘large targets’ includes 
deals that involve target companies with pre-acquisition sales of at least 20% of the sales of their 
acquirers  (44  deals).  The  rest  of  takeovers  comprises  the  sub-sample  of  ‘small  target’ 
transactions  (82  deals).  Table  11  documents  that  relatively  large  takeovers  significantly 
outperform their smaller peers. Combined firms experience an increase in profitability by 3.36% 
following the acquisition of a relatively  large target  and a decrease  by 1.35% following the 
takeover of smaller targets. A possible explanation is that larger M&As have a greater scope to 
explore financial and operating synergies, which is likely to result in a sizable improvement in 
profitability of the combined firm. When we split our sample into quartiles by the relative size of 
the target firm, we find that although the post-merger profitability increases with the size, this 
increase is non-linear. The very large M&As (fourth quartile) tend to be less profitable than the 
medium-size M&As (third quartile), but only the smallest M&As (first quartile) tend to have a 
significant negative impact on the operating performance of the combined firms.
 17 The result 
confirms  our  conjecture  that  problems  of  managing  a  very  large  newly  created  firm  may 
outweigh the alleged benefits of the takeover and hence worsen profitability of the combined 
firm.   
 [INSERT TABLE 11 ABOUT HERE] 
 
5.6    Domestic versus cross-border deals  
Table  12  examines  whether  the  post-acquisition  performance  evolves  differently  following 
domestic and cross-border M&As. Panel A shows that the profitability of the combined firm 
increases by 0.5% following domestic takeovers and decreases by 1.8% following cross-border 
deals. Although the difference in the changes in performance is not statistically significant, it is 
notable  in  economic  terms.  We  further  investigate  whether  there  is  a  difference  in  the 
performance of domestic takeovers across countries. We therefore divide our sample of domestic 
M&As into three sub-samples: UK, French, and other deals. Panel B of Table 12 presents that a 
comparison of UK and French M&As yields inconclusive results, as the conclusion depends on 
the  analysed  profitability  measure.  However,  none  of  the  performance  measures  show 
statistically significant differences in the profitability of UK and French M&As. In contrast, 
independent  of  the  analysed  profitability  measure,  takeovers  undertaken  in  other  European 
                                                 
17 Table is available upon request.    18
countries systematically outperform their UK and French counterparts (the difference is still not 
statistically significant). Therefore, we conclude that the profitability of corporate takeovers is 
similar across all Continental European countries and the UK.        
 [INSERT TABLES 12 ABOUT HERE] 
 
5.7    Multivariate analysis 
Table 13 summarizes the results of our univariate analysis of the determinants of post-merger 
profitability.  In  this  section,  we  explore  the  combined  effect  of  the  determinants  of  the 
profitability in a multivariate framework. Table 14 reports the results of the OLS regressions for 
different  profitability  measures  and  model  specifications.  Overall,  the  regression  results  are 
consistent  with  our  univariate  analysis  findings:  none  of  the  takeover  characteristics  have 
significant power to explain the post-merger profitability of combined firms.
18 The intercept is 
also insignificant in each regression model regardless of its specification, which suggests that the 
operating performance does not change significantly following takeovers. Strikingly, there is a 
systematic  negative  relationship  between  pre-  and  post-acquisition  performance:  better 
performance  prior  to  the  takeover  is  associated  with  poorer  performance  after  the  deal’s 
completion.  
 [INSERT TABLES 13 and 14 ABOUT HERE] 
 
6.  Summary and conclusions  
While numerous research papers have been written on the stock price performance following 
mergers  and  acquisitions,  the  empirical  evidence  on  changes  in  post-acquisition  operating 
performance is relatively scarce and their conclusions are inconsistent. The differences in the 
measurement of profitability and in the benchmarking (the choice of the correct peer-companies) 
is  partly  responsible  for  the  inconsistency  in  conclusions across  studies.  Whilst  most  of  the 
research  focuses  on  US  deals,  there  is  little  empirical  evidence  on  the  long-term  operating 
performance following European mergers and acquisitions.  
 
In this paper, we investigate the long-term profitability of 155 European corporate takeovers 
completed  between  1997  and  2001,  where  the  acquiring  and  target  companies  are  from 
Continental Europe and the UK.  We employ four different measures of operating performance 
that allow us to overcome a number of measurement and statistical limitations of the previous 
                                                 
18 Our results do not change when the multivariate analysis comprises dummies instead of continuous variables for 
pre-acquisition leverage of the acquiring firm, pre-acquisition cash reserves held by the acquirer and relative target 
size.     19
studies and to test whether the conclusions vary across the measures. We find that profitability of 
the  combined  firm  decreases  significantly  following  the  takeover.  However,  this  decrease 
become  insignificant  after  we  control  for  the  performance  of  the  peer  companies  which  are 
chosen in order to control for industry, size and pre-event performance. This suggest that the 
decrease is caused by macroeconomic changes unrelated to takeovers. We also find that both 
acquiring and target companies significantly outperform the median peers in their industry prior 
to  the  takeovers.  We  also  reveal  that  the  conclusions  regarding  changes  in  post-merger 
profitability  critically  depend  on  the  model  applied  to  estimate  the  changes.  Generally,  an 
increase in profitability following M&As is higher when the intercept model is applied, whereas 
the change model returns lower estimates of the increase in post-acquisition profitability. 
 
Our analysis of the determinants of the post-acquisition operating performance reveals that none 
of the takeover characteristics such as  means  of payment, geographical scope,  and industry-
relatedness have significant explanatory power. However, we find an economically significant 
difference in the long-term performance of hostile and friendly takeovers, and of tender offers 
and negotiated deals: the performance deteriorates following hostile bids and tender offers. The 
acquirer’s leverage prior takeover seems to have no impact on the post-merger performance of 
the combined firm, whereas its cash holdings are negatively related to the performance. This 
suggests  that  companies  with  excessive  cash  holdings  suffer  from  free  cash  flow  problems 
(Jensen, 1986) and are more likely to make poor acquisitions. Acquisitions of relatively large 
targets result in better profitability of the combined firm subsequent to the takeover, whereas 
acquisitions of small target lead to the profitability decline.        
   20
References 
Agrawal, A., Jaffe, J.F. and Mandelker, G.N. (1992). The post-merger performance of acquiring 
firms: a re-examination of an anomaly. Journal of Finance 47, 1605-1621. 
Asquith, P. and Mullins, D.W. (1986). Equity issues and offering dilution. Journal of Financial 
Economics 15, 61-89.  
Barber, B.M. and Lyon, J.D. (1996). Detecting abnormal operating performance: the empirical 
power and specification of test statistics. Journal of financial Economics 41, 359-399.  
Bradley, M., A.S. Desai, and E.H. Kim (1988). Synergistic gains from corporate acquisitions and 
their division between the stockholders of target and acquiring firms. Journal of Financial 
Economics 21, 3-40. 
Clark, K. and Ofek, E. (1994). Mergers as a means of restructuring distressed firms: an empirical 
investigation. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 29, 541-566.   
Coffee et al. (Eds.). Knights, raiders and targets. Oxford University Press, New York.  
Cornett, M. and Sankar, De (1991). Medium of payment in corporate acquisitions: Evidence 
from interstate bank mergers. Journal of Money, Credit, and Banking 23, 767.  
Denis, D.J. and Denis, D.K. (1995). Performance changes following top management dismissals. 
The Journal of Finance 50, 1029-1057.  
Dickerson, A.P., Gibson, H.D. and Tsakalotos, E. (1997). The impact of acquisitions on company 
performance: Evidence from a large panel of U.K. firms. Oxford Economic Papers 49, 344-
361. 
Ghosh, A. (2001). Does operating performance really improve following corporate acquisitions? 
Journal of Corporate Finance 7, 151-178. 
Ghosh, A. and Jain, P.J. (2000). Financial leverage changes associated with corporate mergers. 
Journal of Corporate Finance 6, 377-402. 
Ghosh, A. and Ruland, W. (1998). Managerial ownership, method of payments for acquisitions, 
and executive job retention. Journal of Finance 53, 785-798. 
Goergen, M and Renneboog, L. (2004). Shareholder wealth effects of European domestic and 
cross-border takeover bids. European Financial Management Journal 10, 9-45. 
Gugler, K, Mueller, D.C., Yurtoglu, B.B. and Zulehner, C. (2003). The effects of mergers: an 
international comparison. International Journal of Industrial Organization 21, 625-653. 
Harford, J. (1999). Corporate cash reserves and acquisitions. Journal of Finance 54, 1969-1998.  
Healy,  P.J.,  Palepu,  K.G.,  Ruback,  R.S.  (1992).  Does  corporate  performance  improve  after 
mergers? Journal of Financial Economics 31, 135-175.   21
Herman, E. and Lowenstein, L. (1988). The efficiency effects of hostile takeovers. In: Knights, 
Raiders and Targets (J.C. Coffee, Jr., L. Lowenstein, and S. Rose-Ackerman, eds.). New 
York: Oxford University Press, 211-240.  
Heron, R and Lie, E. (2002). Operating performance and the method of payment in takeovers. 
Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 37, 137-156. 
Hogarty, T.F. (1970). The profitability of corporate mergers. The Journal of Business 33, 317-
327. 
Jensen, M.C., 1986. Agency costs of free cash flow, corporate finance, and takeovers. American 
Economic Review 76, 323–329.  
Kang, J.K., Shivdasani, A. and Yamada, T. (2000). The effect of bank relations on investment 
decisions: an investigation of Japanese takeover bids. Journal of Finance 55, 2197-2218.  
Kruse, T.A., Park, H.Y., Park, K., Suzuki, K.I. (2002). The value of corporate diversification: 
evidence from post-merger performance in Japan. AFA 2003 Washington, DC Meetings. 
Lev, B. and Mandelker, G. (1972). The microeconomic consequences of corporate mergers. The 
Journal of Business 45, 85-104. 
Linn, S.C. and Switzer, J.A. (2001). Are cash acquisitions associated with better postcombination 
operating performance than stock acquisitions? Journal of Banking and Finance 6, 1113-
1138. 
Loughran,  T.  and  Vijh,  A.  (1997).  Do  long  term  shareholders  benefit  from  corporate 
acquisitions? The Journal of Finance 52, 1765-1790.  
Maloney, M.T., McCormick, R.E. and Mitchell, M.L. (1993). Managerial decision making and 
capital structure. Journal of Business 66, 189-217 
Martynova, M. and  Renneboog, L. 2006a.  Takeover  waves:  triggers,  performance  and  motives, 
Working paper European Corporate Governance Institute.   
Martynova, M. and L. Renneboog, 2006b. Mergers and acquisitions in Europe, in L. Renneboog 
(ed.), Advances in Corporate Finance and Asset Pricing, Amsterdam: Elsevier.  
Masulis, R.W. and Korwar, A.N. (1986). Seasoned equity offerings: an empirical investigation. 
Journal of Financial Economics, 91-118. 
Meeks,  G.  (1977).  Disappointing  marriage:  a  study  of  the  gains  from  merger.  Cambridge 
University Press.   22
Moeller,  S.B.  and  Schlingemann,  F.P.  (2004).  Are  cross-border  acquisitions  different  from 
domestic acquisitions? Evidence on stock and operating performance for U.S. acquirers. 
Journal of Banking and Finance.  
Mueller,  D.C.  (ed.)  (1980),  The  determinants  and  effects  of  mergers:  an  international 
comparison. Cambridge, Mass.: Oelgeschlager, Gunn & Hain.  
Parrino, J.D. and Harris, R.S. (1999). Takeovers, management replacement, and post-acquisition 
operating  performance:  some  evidence  from  the  1980s.  Journal  of  Applied  Corporate 
Finance 11, 88-97.  
Powell, R.G., Stark, A.W. (2005). Does operating performance increase post-takeover for UK 
takeovers? A comparison of performance measures and benchmarks. Journal of Corporate 
Finance11, 293-317. 
Rahman, R.A. and Limmack, R.J. (2004). Corporate acquisitions and the operating performance 
of Malaysian companies. Journal of Business Finance & Accounting 31, 359-400.   
Ravenscraft,  D.J.  and  Scherer,  F.J.  (1987).  Mergers,  selloffs,  and  economic  efficiency. 
Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution.   
Sharma, D.S. and Ho, J. (2002). The impact of acquisitions on operating performance: some 
Australian evidence. Journal of Business Finance & Accounting 29, 155-200.   
Spiess,  D.K.  and  Affleck-Graves,  J.  (1995).  Underperformance  in  long-run  stock  returns 
following seasoned equity offerings. Journal of Financial Economics, 243-267. 
Switzer, J.A. (1996). Evidence on real gains in corporate acquisitions. Journal of Economics and 
Business 48, 443-460. 
Yeh, T.M. and Hoshino, Y. (2002). Productivity and operating performance of Japanese merging 
firms: Keiretsu-related and independent mergers. Japan and the World Economy 14, 347-
366.   
    23
Table 1: Overview of the empirical studies on post-acquisition operating performance 
 
Author(s)  Sample 
period 
Market  Sample 
size 
Performance 
measure                                   






Studies that document an improvement in  post-acquisition operating performance 
Powell & Stark (2005)  1985-
1993 
UK  191  (1) Pre-tax CF        




Assets        
(2) Adj. 
MV Assets               
(3) BV 
Assets        
(4) Sales                             
(1) Industry 
(2) Industry, 
Size and  
Pre-event 
performance 









Malaysia  113  "Pure" CF 
(incl. changes 
in WC) 
BV Assets  Industry and 
Size 
A and T  C + I  Operating cash flow 
performance 
improves  
Heron & Lie (2002)  1985-
1997 
US  859  Operating 
income 










Linn & Switzer (2001)  1967-
1987 
US  413  Pre-tax CF  MV Assets  Industry  A and T  C  Post-acquisition 
cash flow increases 
 
Parrino & Harris (1999)   1982-
1987 
US  197  Pre-tax CF  Adj. MV 
Assets 




Switzer (1996)  1967-
1987 
US  324  Pre-tax CF  MV Assets  Industry  A and T  C + I  Median performance 
improves over 5 
years following the 
acquisition  




US  50  Pre-tax CF  Adj. MV 
Assets 
Industry  A and T  C + I  Post-merger 
operating cash flow 
returns increase 






2,362*  Pre-tax CF  MV assets  Industry  Only A  I  Negative (but 
insignificant) 





domestic acquirers.  
Gugler, Mueller, Yurtoglu 
& Zulehner (2003) 
1981-
1998 
World  2,753  (1) EBIT          
(2) Sales 
No scaling  Industry  None   Other  Post-acquisition 




are lower than 
predicted (mostly 
significantly).  
Studies that document no significant changes in post-acquisition operating performance 
Sharma & Ho (2002)  1986-
1991 




Assets          
(2) BV 
Equity                 





A and T  C + I  Insignificant change 
in post-acquisition 
performance.  
Ghosh (2001)  1981-
1995 
World  315  Pre-tax CF  Adj. MV 
Assets 
Industry, 
Size and  
Pre-event 
performance 
A and T  C + I  No significant 
changes in operating 
performance 
following M&As 







56  (1) Net income           
(2) EBIT 
(1) BV 
Equity         
(2) Capital 
Unmatched  Only A  C  Bidders’ return on 
capital (ROC) 
decreases; ROE 
increases.    24
 
Table 1 continued                   
Author(s)  Sample 
period 
Market  Sample 
size 
Performance 
measure                                   

















Profit after tax  BV Assets  Industry and 
Size 
None   Other  Belgium, Germany, 
UK, and US: an 
increase in post-
merger profitability;  
France, Netherlands, 
and Sweden: a 
decline in 
profitability.  
Lev & Mandelker (1972)   1952-
1963 
US  69  (1) Net income           
(2) Op. income                                                                                                            
(1) BV 
Assets       
(2) BV 
Equity        
(3) Nr of 









measures exhibit no 
significant changes  
Lev & Mandelker (1972)   1952-
1963 
US  69  (1) Net income           
(2) Op. income                                                                     
(1) BV 
Assets       
(2) BV 
Equity        
(3) Nr of 









measures exhibit no 
significant changes  
Studies that document a deterioration in  post-acquisition operating performance 




Japan  46  Pre-tax CF  (1) Adj. 




A and T  C + I  Overall decline in 
cash flow; however, 
mergers lead to a 
significant 
improvement in the 
performance  
Yeh & Hoshino (2001)  1970-
1994 
Japan  86  (1) Net income  
(2) Op. income                                                    
(1) BV 
Equity       
(2) BV 
Assets 
Industry  Only A  Other  Significant decline 
in ROA and ROE 
following a merger; 
however, only 
M&As that involve 
keiretsu are 
followed by a 
significant decline 
in ROE and ROA; 
M&As involving 
independent firms – 
do not.  




UK  1,443**  Pre-tax profits  Net assets  Industry  Only A  Other  A significant decline 
in acquirer’s ROA  





38  EBITD                                 Sales  Industry  A and T  C  Operating 
performance 
declines over 3 
years following 
M&As  
Meeks (1977)  1964-
1972 
UK  223  Pre-tax profits  Net assets  Industry  A and T  C  Post-merger 
profitability is 
significantly lower 
than the pre-merger 
profitability.  
Hogarty (1970)   1953-
1964 
US  43  EPS and 
Capital gains  
Nr. of 
shares 
Industry  Only A  Other  Investment 
performance of the 





* While the total sample consists of 4,430 acquisitions, the regression model used to estimate changes in operating performance is based on 2,362 
observations.                                                                                                                                                                                                                         
** More specifically, the sample includes 2,941 companies, of which 613 (21%) companies were involved in 1,443 acquisitions. 
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Total Nr of completed deals (’97-’01):  873  
Removed deals:          15
(a) -    
Net # of deals:        858 (100%)  
 
Nr. of deals where A and T have at least   
1 year pre- and 1 year post-acquisition  
financials available in Amadeus:    155 (18%) 
 
Nr. of deals where A and T have at least     
3 years pre- and post-acquisition  
financials available:        81 (9%) 
 
(a) 15 deals were removed from the sample because of the following 
reasons: target (or part of target) was sold again within 1 year after the 
acquisition (8x), more than 1 acquirer (2x), acquirer was taken over 
within 1 year after acquisition (2x), other (3x).    26
Table 3. Sample description 
 












                         
Panel A: Completion year           Panel E: Pre-acquisition acquirer leverage
(a) 
                         
   1997  7  5%       Leverage <15%  65  42% 
   1998  26  17%       Leverage 15%-30%  41  26% 
   1999  38  25%       Leverage 30%-45%  22  14% 
   2000  54  35%       Leverage >45%  20  13% 
   2001  30  19%       Unknown  7  5% 
   TOTAL  155  100%       TOTAL  155  100% 
                         
Panel B: Acquirer country              (median leverage = 16.81%)      
                         
   Austria  1  1%     Panel F: Pre-acquisition acquirer cash reserves
(b) 
   Belgium  3  2%               
   Czech Republic  1  1%       Cash reserves <5%  66  43% 
   Finland  3  2%       Cash reserves 5%-10%  30  19% 
   France  36  23%       Cash reserves 10%-15%  17  11% 
   Germany  9  6%       Cash reserves >15%  40  26% 
   Italy  4  3%       Unknown  2  1% 
   Netherlands  3  2%       TOTAL  155  100% 
   Norway  3  2%               
   Portugal  1  1%        (median cash reserves = 6.41%)    
   Spain  8  5%               
   Sweden  9  6%     Panel G: Industry relatedness
(c)       
   Switzerland  4  3%               
   United Kingdom 70  45%       Focused  49  32% 
   TOTAL  155  100%       Unfocused  55  35% 
                 Unknown  51  33% 
Panel C: Method of payment             TOTAL  155  100% 
                         
   Cash  108  70%     Panel H: Relative size of target
(d)    
   Stock  16  10%               
   Mix  31  20%       Target size <10%  82  53% 
   TOTAL  155  100%       Target size 10%-20%  25  16% 
                 Target size >20%  47  30% 
Panel D: Deal atmosphere             Unknown  1  1% 
                 TOTAL  155  100% 
   Friendly  144  93%               
   Hostile  11  7%        (median target size = 8.28%)    
   TOTAL  155  100%               
               Panel I: Cross-border deals       
   Tender offer  54  35%               
   Negotiated deal  101  65%       Domestic  104  67% 
   TOTAL  155  100%       Cross-border  51  33% 
                 TOTAL  155  100% 
                         
(a) Defined as long-term debt plus loans divided by book value of total assets; all measures are one year prior to the year of acquisition.  
(b) Defined as cash and cash equivalents divided by book value of total assets; all measures are one year prior to the year of acquisition.  
(c) Defined by a 2-digit NACE industry code.  
(d) Defined as the target’s sales divided by the acquirer’s sales; all measures are one year prior to the year of acquisition.    27
Table 4. Changes in operating performance following acquisitions 








                
              
           
  
BVassets 
’Raw’ performance     Industry-adjusted    
Industry, Size and 
Performance adjusted    
        median (%)   
Nr. 














obs    
      -3  10.23    56    -1.04 
   46%  37    1.16 
   51%  39   
      -2  11.46    91    -0.05 
   50%  76    1.82 
   56%  71   
      -1  10.75    123    3.77 
b)  64%  110    0.01 
   50%  105   
     
Median pre-acquisition 
performance  10.82    125    1.58 
a)  56%  114    -0.04 
   49%  110   
                      
              
           
      1  10.16    121    3.15 
   59%  102    0.87 
   55%  103   
      2  8.95    120    1.77 
   57%  99    -0.60 
   49%  101   
      3  9.53    110    3.55 
c)  74%  92    1.87 
   63%  88   
     
Median post-acquisition 
performance  9.16    125    3.27 
c)  68%  114    0.84 
   55%  110   
                      
              
           
      Median difference  -0.90**  125    +0.05 
      114    -0.62 
      110   
      % positive differences  42%    125    52% 
      114    49% 
      110   
                      
              
           






 )                
              
           
  
Sales 
’Raw’ performance     Industry-adjusted    
Industry, Size and 
Performance adjusted    
        
Median 
(%)   
Nr. 














obs    
      -3  8.65    57    3.56 
b)  67%  35    1.57 
   59%  39   
      -2  10.12    91    3.92 
a)  62%  71    -0.69 
   46%  69   
      -1  9.78    122    3.23 
b)  60%  106    0.45 
   51%  101   
     
Median pre-acquisition 
performance  8.98    125    3.34 
b)  60%  112    -0.51 
   50%  107   
                      
              
           
      1  11.24    122    3.56 
b)  65%  99    2.98 
   58%  101   
      2  9.46    120    3.58 
c)  65%  95    -0.35 
   49%  97   
      3  10.41    112    4.79 
c)  71%  91    1.75 
   53%  88   
     
Median post-acquisition 
performance  9.46    125    3.94 
c)  66%  112    1.05 
   54%  107   
                      
              
           
      Median difference  -0.03    125    +1.69 
      112    +0.15 
      107   
      % positive differences  49%    125    56% 
      112    51% 
      107   
                      
              
             28
Table 4 (continued) 
  Measure 3  EBITDA                
              
           
  
BVassets 
’Raw’ performance     Industry-adjusted    
Industry, Size and 
Performance adjusted    
        
Median 
(%)   
Nr. 














obs    
      -3  12.48    92    2.73 
c)  64%  85    1.07 
c)  67%  75   
      -2  12.51    122    2.37 
c)  60%  116    1.59 
b)  59%  108   
      -1  11.70    155    1.89 
c)  62%  154    0.15 
a)  58%  153   
     
Median pre-acquisition 
performance  12.27    155    2.12 
c)  61%  154    0.39 
c)  61%  154   
                      
             
           
      1  10.17    153    0.83 
   55%  148    0.54 
   52%  151   
      2  10.02    149    0.52 
   55%  140    0.67 
   55%  146   
      3  9.82    142    1.34 
b)  58%  132    0.83 
   55%  131   
     
Median post-acquisition 
performance  10.23    155    0.67 
a)  59%  154    0.43 
   54%  154   
                      
              
           
      Median difference  -1.73***  155    -1.02 **     154    -0.01 
      154   
      % positive differences  37%    155    44% 
      154    50% 
      154   
  Measure 4  EBITDA                
              
           
  
Sales 
’Raw’ performance     Industry-adjusted    
Industry, Size and 
Performance adjusted    
        median (%)   
Nr.  














obs    
      -3  11.02    90    4.35 
c)  68%  78    2.39 
a)  63%  71   
      -2  10.82    119    4.01 
c)  65%  108    0.50 
   52%  103   
      -1  11.10    153    3.59 
c)  70%  145    0.90 
   58%  146   
     
Median pre-acquisition 
performance  11.26    154    3.34 
c)  70%  147    0.99 
   58%  148   
                      
             
           
      1  10.75    153    3.11 
c)  63%  140    1.49 
   57%  146   
      2  10.67    150    3.23 
c)  67%  135    1.57 
   56%  141   
      3  10.48    149    2.75 
c)  67%  133    1.48 
   56%  134   
     
Median post-acquisition 
performance  11.44    154    3.22 
c)  69%  147    1.72 
   55%  148   
                       
              
           
      Median difference   -0.65*       154    -0.12 
      147    +0.16 
      148   
      % positive differences  45%    154    48% 
      147    52% 
      148   
     
*** / ** / * Significant at the 1% / 5% / 10% level. Wilcoxon signed rank test shows that median post-acquisition 
performance is significantly different from median pre-acquisition performance.    
     
a) / 
b) / 
c) Significant at the 10% / 5% / 1% level. Wilcoxon signed rank test  shows that the firm’s performance is 
significantly different from peer performance in the same year.     
      #  Working capital is defined each year as stocks plus accounts receivables minus accounts payables     
     
## For measures 1 and 2, cash flow in 1995 equals EBITDA (changes in working capital are not included) because 
changes in working capital are not available in Amadeus for that year. Our conclusions do not change materially when 
we exclude year 1995 from the analysis.     
     
### For measures 2 and 4, one deal is removed from the sample because the acquirer in this deal has an  EBITDA-to-sales 
of -26,200% in the year following the acquisition (almost zero sales are recorded in that year).     
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Table 5.  Do takeovers lead to a better management of working capital? 
 
   Measure 
’Raw’ changes in 





performance  Obs.    
                            




-2.18***  151  -1.97**  146  -0.43  144 
  




-0.80  150  -0.72  139  +0.77  137 
  
                             
  
*** / ** Significant at the 1% / 5% level. Wilcoxon signed rank test shows that the median level of post-acquisition working 
capital is significantly different from the median level of pre-acquisition working capital.    
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Table 6.  The change model versus the intercept model: comparison of results 
 
Panel A: Median change in operating performance (%) 
Measure  Industry 
adjusted 
Industry, Size and Performance 
adjusted 








1.   
assets BV
WC EBITDA ) ( D -   +0.1  +0.3 (a)  -0.6  -0.2 (e) 
2.   
Sales
WC EBITDA ) ( D -   +1.7  +12.0** (b)  +0.2  +9.3 (f) 
3.          
assets BV
EBITDA   -1.0**  +0.5 (c)  -0.01  +0.5 (g) 
4.         
Sales
EBITDA
  -0.1  +24.3 (d)  +0.2  +0.9 (h) 




ind medianCF medianCF × + = 261 . 0 003 . 0  




ind medianCF medianCF × + = 786 . 0 120 . 0              




ind medianCF medianCF × + = 506 . 0 005 . 0        




ind medianCF medianCF × + = 937 . 1 243 . 0                                      




perf szie ind medianCF medianCF , , , , 423 . 0 002 . 0 × - - =                                                                                      




perf szie ind medianCF medianCF , , , , 206 . 0 093 . 0 × - =                                                                       




perf szie ind medianCF medianCF , , , , 506 . 0 005 . 0 × - =                                                                     




perf szie ind medianCF medianCF , , , , 380 . 0 009 . 0 × - =                                                                  
(0.76)    (-5.01***)                        
*** / ** Significant at 1% / 5%, using a two-tailed test 
 
R































2 = 0.15 
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Table 7    Median changes in operating performance (%-point) by means of payment 
 
                                

























￿ assets  -0.83**  88  -2.79  11  -0.50  26  no  no 


















￿   -0.31  88  +1.18  11  -0.22  26  no  no 
                       
 Adjusted for the 





























￿ assets  +0.95  78  -1.21  10  -1.86  22  no  no 


















￿   +0.08  76  +2.23  10  -1.27  21  no  no 
                                
      ** Significant at the 5% level; Wilcoxon sign rank test shows that the median post-acquisition performance is 
significantly different from median pre-acquisition performance. 
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Table 8    Median changes in operating performance (%-points) by the attitude of the 
target’s board towards the bid (hostile vs. friendly) and by the form of takeover (tender 
offer vs. negotiated deal) 
 
Panel A: Attitude of the target’s board towards the bid (hostile versus friendly)    
                          
’Raw’ performance    Measure  Friendly  Obs.  Hostile  Obs.   Statistical significance of 
difference 
(M-Whitney)    













￿ assets   -0.83**  118  -2.67  7  no    


















￿   -0.02  118  -1.94  7  no    
                    
Adjusted for 





















￿ assets   +0.60  104  -6.31  6  no    


















￿   +0.31  101  -5.81  6  no    
                    
     
** Significant at the 5% level. Wilcoxon signed rank test shows that median post-acquisition performance is 
significantly different from median pre-acquisition performance.    
 
Panel B: Form of takeover (tender offer versus negotiated deal)    
                          
’Raw’ performance    Measure  Negotiated 
deal 
Obs.  Tender 
offer 
Obs.   Statistical significance 
of difference 
(M-Whitney)    













￿ assets   -1.51**  79  +0.03  46  no    


















￿   -0.65  79  +0.86  46  no    
                   
Adjusted for 




   Measure  Negotiated 
deal 
Obs.  Tender 
offer 

















￿ assets   +0.95  68  -1.28  42  no    


















￿   +0.65  65  -1.53  42  no    
                         
     
** Significant at the 5% level. Wilcoxon signed rank test shows that median post-acquisition performance is 
significantly different from median pre-acquisition performance.    
     
# To test for significance of the difference in profitability of friendly and hostile deals we employ a Mann-
Whitney test.    
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Table 9    Median changes in operating performance (%-point) by leverage and cash 
reserves of the acquirer 
Panel A: Leverage    
                                      
’Raw’ performance   Measure  Lev 
Q1 
Obs.  Lev 
Q2 
Obs.  Lev 
Q3 
Obs.  Lev 
Q4 

























￿ assets  -2.67  29  -1.11  28  -1.28  32  -0.10  29  no  no 


















￿   -0.53  30  +0.73  27  -0.66  32  -0.00  29  no  no 
                          
Adjusted for the 




  Measure  Lev  
Q1 
Obs.  Lev  
Q2 
Obs.  Lev  
Q3 
Obs.  Lev  
Q4 

























￿ assets  -1.12  26  +0.00  22  -0.32  28  +1.57  27  no  no 


















￿   +0.18  26  +2.73  21  +2.87  27  -1.57  26  no  no 
                                     
     * None of the changes in post-acquisition performance are significantly different from pre-acquisition performance, using the Wilcoxon signed 
rank test 
     
# There are no significant differences among the leverage quartiles, using both a Chi-Square test and a Mann-Whitney test to see whether the 
median values differ.  
 
Panel B: cash reserves     
                                      
’Raw’ performance   Measure  Cash  
Q1 
Obs.  Cash  
Q2 
Obs.  Cash  
Q3 
Obs.  Cash  
Q4 

























￿ assets  -0.10  29  -0.96  29  -3.28**  33  -0.19  32  no  no 


















￿   +1.90  29  +0.04  29  -1.01  33  +0.02  32  no  no 
                          
Adjusted for the 






  Measure  Cash  
Q1 
Obs.  Cash  
Q2 
Obs.  Cash  
Q3 
Obs.  Cash  
Q4 

























￿ assets  +1.57  25  -0.10  26  -0.63  27  -2.45  30  no  no 


















￿   +3.32  25  +1.03  26  +0.31  25  -3.79  29  no  no 
                           
     
** Significance at the 5% level. Wilcoxon signed rank test shows that median post-acquisition performance is significantly different from 
median pre-acquisition performance. 
    
# To test for statistical significance of the differences in performance measures across the sub-groups, we employ a Chi-Square test when 2 
sub-groups are compared and a Mann-Whitney when more than 2 sub-groups are compared.    34
Table 10. Median changes in operating performance (%-point) by takeover strategy (focus 
versus diversification) 
 
                          


















￿ assets  -0.65  47  -3.03  40  yes
a)    


















￿   +0.36  47  -1.93  39  no    
                    
Adjusted for the performance 
of the Industry-Size-
Performance-matched peer  
   Measure  Diversification  Obs.  Focus  Obs.   Statistical 
significance of 
difference 
(M-Whitney)    













￿ assets  -0.88  40  -0.02  34  no    


















￿   +2.73  39  -1.35  33  no    
                          
     
* None of the changes in post-acquisition performance are statistically significantly different from pre-
acquisition performance (the conclusion is based on the results of the Wilcoxon signed rank test) 
    
     
a) Significantly different at the 10% level. Mann-Whitney test shows whether focus acquisition strategy 
leads to a significantly different performance of the combined firm than the diversification strategy.    
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Table 11.    Median changes in operating performance (%-point) by the relative size of the 
target firm 
 
                          
’Raw’ performance   Measure  Large 
targets
# 
Obs.  Small 
targets 


















￿ assets  -2.17  44  -0.76  81  no    


















￿   +1.18  43  -0.40  82  no    
                  
Adjusted for the performance 
of   
the Industry-Size-
Performance-matched peer  
  Measure  Large 
targets 
Obs.  Small 
targets 
Obs.  Statistical 
significance of 
difference 
(M-Whitney)    













￿ assets  +0.63  39  -1.12  71  no    


















￿   +3.36  38  -1.35  69  yes
a)    
                        
     * None of the changes in performance is significant at least at the 10%-level.    
     
a) Significantly different at the 10% level. Mann-Whitney test shows whether the 
profitability of relatively large M&As is significantly different from that of the 
relatively small M&As.  
     
# The sub-group includes acquisitions of relatively large targets with sales of at 
least 20% of bidder sales in the year prior to the acquisition. The ‘Small targets’ 
sub-group includes deals that involve relatively small targets with the relative (to 
the acquirer) size of sales of less than 20%.  
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Table 12   Median changes in operating performance (%-point) in domestic and cross-
border M&As 
 Panel A: Domestic versus Cross-border deals 
                          





















￿ assets  -0.90  85  -0.99*  40  no   


















￿   -0.24  85  +0.02  40  no   
                    
Adjusted for the 
performance of   
the Industry-Size-
Performance-matched peer  





















￿ assets  +0.57  73  -1.81  37  no   


















￿   +0.48  70  -1.79  37  no   
                         
    
* Significant at the 10% level. Wilcoxon signed rank test shows that median post-acquisition 
performance is significantly different from median pre-acquisition performance.    
     
# None of the differences in profitability of domestic and cross-border deals are significant at least at the 
10% level (based on the results of the Mann-Whitney test). 
 
 Panel B:   Domestic deals for the UK, France and other European countries (%-point)   
                                 
’Raw’ 
performance 
   Measure  Deals 
within 
the UK 
Obs.  Deals 
within 
France 






























￿ assets  -0.86  42  +0.35  22  -2.33  21  no  no   


















￿   +0.47  42  +1.32  22  -2.95  21  no  no   
     
              








matched peer     
Measure  Deals 
within 
the UK 
Obs.  Deals 
within 
France 
















(M-Whitney)   













￿ assets  -0.87  34  +1.83  19  +2.02  20  no  no   


















￿   +0.26  32  -0.14  18  +1.00  20  no  no   
                                  
     
# None of the changes in the performance is significant at least at the 10%-level (the conclusion is based on the results of  
the Wilcoxon signed rank test) 
 
     
## To test for statistical significance of the differences in performance measures across the sub-groups, we employ a Chi-
Square test when 2 sub-groups are compared and a Mann-Whitney when more than 2 sub-groups are compared . 
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Table 13 Summary of the results 
1) 
Section  Variables  Is there a significant change in adjusted operating 
performance for each subgroup individually? 
2) 
Are the differences across 
the sub-groups statistically 
significant? 
3) 
5.1  Cash versus Equity Payment  ·  Cash offers: an increase in operating profitability by 095% 
(statistically insignificant);  
·  Stock and mixed offers: a decrease by 1.21% and 1.86% 
respectively (statistically insignificant).  
No. 
5.2  Friendly versus Hostile 
takeovers 
·  Friendly M&As: an increase in profitability by 0.60% 
(statistically insignificant);  
·  Hostile bids: a decrease by 6.31% (statistically 
insignificant). 
No. 
5.2  Tender Offer versus 
Negotiated Deal 
·  Tender offers: a decline in profitability by 1.28% 
(statistically insignificant); 
·  Negotiated deals: an increase in profitability by 0.95% 
(statistically insignificant).  
No. 
5.3  Pre-acquisition Leverage of 
the Acquirer 
·  Acquirers with lowest level of leverage (Q1): a decline in 
profitability by 1.12% (statistically insignificant); 
·  Acquirers with highest level of leverage (Q4): an increase 
in profitability by 1.57% (statistically insignificant).  
No. 
5.3  Pre-acquisition Cash 
Reserves of the Acquirer 
·  Acquirers with lowest level of cash reserves (Q1): an 
increase in profitability by 1.57% (statistically 
insignificant); 
·  Acquirers with highest level of leverage (Q4): a decline in 
profitability by 2.45% (statistically insignificant). 
No. 
5.4  Focus versus Diversification 
Takeover Strategy 
·  Industry focus: a decline in profitability by 0.02% 
(statistically insignificant); 
·  Industry diversification: a decline in profitability by 0.88% 
(statistically insignificant). 
No. 
5.5  Relative Size of the Target  ·  Relatively small targets (Q1): a decline in profitability by 
1.12% to –1.35% (statistically insignificant);   
·  Relatively large targets (Q4): an increase in profitability by 
0.63%-3.36% (statistically insignificant). 
Yes. 
5.6  Domestic versus Cross-
border M&As 
·  Domestic M&As: an increase in profitability by 0.57% 
(statistically insignificant); 
·  Cross-border M&As: a decline in profitability by 1.81% 
(statistically insignificant). 
No. 
1) Note that the main conclusions are based on the performance measures adjusted for the performance of a peer company matched 
by industry, size and pre-acquisition performance (and not on the 'raw' performance measure). 
2) To test for statistical significance of the results we employ a Wilcoxon sign rank test. 
3) To test for statistical significance of the differences across the sub-groups we employ a Mann-Whitney test when compare 2 sub-
groups  and a Chi-Square test when compare more than 2 sub-groups.   38
Table 14.  The determinants of post-merger operating performance: multivariate analysis 
 
     Dependent variable: performance adjusted for industry, size and pre-
acquisition performance    











































￿   Expected 
sign 
     (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)    
  Independent variables:                            
                               
  Intercept  -0.018  -0.025  -0.006  -0.002  0.146  0.044  -0.005  0.093  zero 
     (-0.26)  (-0.48)  (-0.17)  (-0.10)  (0.36)  (0.16)  (0.03)  (1.06)    
                               
  Pre-acq. adj. performance  -0.184  -0.380**  -0.449***  -0.423***  -0.153  -0.223  -0.242  -0.206    
     (-0.88)  (-2.57)  (-3.28)  (-3.26)  (-0.14)  (-0.92)  (-1.06)  (-0.93)    
                               
  Cash Payment (dummy)  0.034  0.002        0.230  0.039        zero 
     (0.61)  (0.04)        (0.68)  (0.17)          
                               
  Hostile Bid (dummy)  -0.111  -0.039  -0.029     -0.458  -0.310  -0.262     negative 
     (-0.94)  (-0.50)  (-0.38)     (-0.65)  (-0.75)  (-0.66)       
                               
  Tender offer (dummy)  0.073  0.038  -0.022     0.718**  0.308  0.243     negative 
     (1.31)  (0.97)  (0.59)     (2.12)  (1.47)  (1.27)       
                               
  Acquirer pre-acq. Leverage  -0.135  0.041        -1.387  -0.395        zero 
     (-0.87)  (0.38)        (-1.43)  (-0.67)          
                               
  Acquirer pre-acq. Cash Reserves  -0.218  -0.037  -0.048     -1.672  -0.953  -0.734     negative 
     (-1.05)  (-0.23)  (-0.33)     (-1.34)  (-1.09)  (-0.97)       
                               
  Industry focus (dummy)  0.040           -0.099           zero 
     (0.75)           (-0.30)             
                               
  Relative size of the target  -0.011  0.000  0.000     0.012  -0.001  -0.001     positive 
     (-0.49)  (0.46)  (0.47)     (0.09)  (-0.26)  (-0.18)       
                               
  Cross-border M&A (dummy)  0.410  0.020  0.006     0.610*  0.342  0.292     negative 
     (0.73)  (0.51)  (0.17)     (1.79)  (1.62)  (1.52)       
                               
  Number of deals  66  101  107  109  63  97  104  107    
  F-statistic  0.548  0.998  1.905*  10.628***  1.134  0.855  0.961  0.859    
  p-value  0.833  0.443  0.087  0.001  0.356  0.558  0.456  0.356    
  R
2  0.081  0.080  0.102  0.090  0.159  0.071  0.056  0.008    
*** / ** Significant at the 1% / 5% level 









































Median pre-acquisition                           
adjusted performance 
-3                       -2                           -1                                                   1                        2      3 








Median post-acquisition                            
adjusted performance 
1 Pre-acquisition performance of acquirer’s and target’s peer company is combined with acquirer’s and target’s relative asset or 
sales weights in the years –3, -2 and –1. Peers are selected on (1) industry median or (2) industry, size and pre-event 
performance.                                                                                                                                                                                          
2 Post-acquisition, combined performance of peer companies is calculated in a similar way as in pre-acquisition years. The only 
difference is that performance of peer companies is combined with fixed asset or sales weights of acquirer and target in year –1 
(the reason is that T does not separately report assets values after the acquisition anymore).   
Improvement? 
Year of 
acquisition 